The paper provides an empirical investigation of labor market pooling. The analysis concentrates on Italian industrial districts and shows that there is fragmentary evidence of a widespread wage premium. In particular, there is no evidence of district differentials for the returns to seniority while there is evidence of negative differentials for the returns to education. Moreover, dwelling in a district has no impact on the probability of being selfemployed and only a minor impact on the likelihood of transiting from wage-and-salary to self-employment. Finally, there is no evidence of higher district worker mobility across jobs.
by Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) and by Guiso and Schivardi (2000) provide some evidence on the relevance of the information-spillover motive.
The labor-market motive, the first pillar, has received a great deal of attention, but this has been focused on the theoretical side. Marshall's idea is that a pooled labor market benefits both firms and workers: "A localized industry gains a great advantage from the fact that it offers a constant market for skill. Employers are apt to resort to any place where they are likely to find a good choice of workers with the special skill which they require; while men seeking employment naturally go to places where there are many employers who need such skill as theirs and where therefore it is likely to find a good market. The owner of an isolated factory, even if he has good access to plentiful supply of general labor, is often put to great shifts for want of some special skilled labor; and a skilled workman, when thrown out of employment in it, has no easy refuge" (Marshall, 1890) .
In his seminal work, Krugman (1991) shows that the efficiency gains from creating a localized industry with a pooled labor market are due to imperfectly correlated labor demand schedules for firms that may experience either "good times" or "bad times." Being in the same place would allow firms to take advantage of additional workers available during peak periods. At the same time, it would benefit workers, since the average rate of unemployment will correspondingly be lower. Krugman shows that agglomeration would drive wages up. In particular, because of efficiency gains, clustering would emerge as the outcome of a tug-ofwar between firms, which prefer a less competitive labor market and hence dispersed production locations, and workers, who prefer a more competitive market and hence concentration. On the one hand, Diamond and Simon (1990) show the importance of an insurance motive: workers could be willing to accept lower wages in locations where other firms stand by ready to hire them.
In a vein similar to Krugman's tug-of-war, Rotemberg and Saloner (1990) suggest that workers -suppliers of industry-specific human capital, which is costly to acquire -might find it advantageous to locate where there are several potential firms that need such an input.
In a pooled labor market, competition among firms would ensure a fair return to workers. In the absence of such competition, workers would be subject to the monopsony power of the firms. Anticipating such an outcome, workers would not choose to invest in industry-specific human capital. This model explains why the location decision of firms and workers are interdependent, and provides the prediction that wages within cluster should be higher. In a recent paper, Combes and Duranton (2001) propose a duopoly game where firms face a tradeoff between the benefits of labor pooling (availability of workers whose knowledge helps reducing costs) and the costs of labor poaching (loss of some key workers to competition and the indirect effects of a higher wage bill to retain workers). The model combines the first and the second of Marshall's pillars, since workers have access to firmspecific knowledge and the pooled labor market acts as a conduit for spillovers, generating a set of predictions for wages and mobility. In particular, clusters should show higher wages and greater flows of workers between firms than isolated firms. Moreover, wages should be increasing over time, because experienced workers accumulate the kind of firm-specific knowledge that triggers poaching.
While a number of empirical analyses have been carried out for well-known clusters such as Silicon-Valley and Route 128 (or Prato and Biella, for the Italian case) the lack of data has severely constrained the investigation of pooled labor markets taken as a whole.
Poor data are the outcome of two shortcomings. First, macro-data are not fine enough to capture clusters (even when desegregated by regions or smaller areas), since the geographical extension of a cluster does not usually coincide with the administrative jurisdiction for which the data are available (e.g. municipalities, provinces, etc.). Second, in order to empirically investigate clusters taken as a whole, a definition providing a sensible singling out criterion is needed.
Following Signorini (2000) , this paper proposes an empirical investigation of the labor market in Italian industrial districts (IIDs) that tries to overcome the above shortcomings by compounding the Bank of Italy's Survey of Household Income and Wealth micro-data with the official Istat-Sforzi Algorithm that singles out IIDs. Our empirical strategy is composed of three blocks. First, we measure whether wages in IIDs are significantly different from those in isolated firms, controlling for worker's, firm's and geographic area's observable characteristics. In this context, we also analyze the role of the Mincerian determinants of wages. Second, we estimate the extent to which the probability of being self-employed, the likelihood of transiting from wage-and-salary to self-employment, and the worker's mobility across jobs are higher within IIDs. Finally, we provide a robustness check for the results based on sample restrictions and a finer definition of industrial districts. To this end, we undertake the same analysis on both Superdistricts and a continuous district variable, as defined by Cannari and Signorini (2000) . Superdistricts are an IIDs sub-sample where the Istat-Sforzi district characteristics are highly emphasized. The continuous district variable is a variable that assigns each area (whether district or not) a value representing the degree of district features shown.
Our empirical investigation is linked to the recent applied literature on the returns to seniority and schooling. Neal (1995) and Parent (2000) show that the share of returns to seniority that could be attributed to firm-specific skills (which could represent a wage loss in case of displacement) is modest compared with the one that could be related to sectorspecific skills (which are not lost as long as the worker remains in the same industry). Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) and Ciccone and Peri (2000) observe that the returns to schooling might be higher in agglomerations since clustering facilitates exchange of ideas and triggers externalities that in turn raise private returns. Thus, the role of returns to seniority and schooling for cluster workers could shed light on these issues. Moreover, our work is related to a number of studies that concentrate on the peculiar functioning of the labor market within Italian industrial districts. This literature is mostly based on the analysis of specific case studies. Based on the evidence of Prato and Biella, Signorini (1994) suggests that average wages are higher in districts than elsewhere. In studies on Carpi, Solinas (1982 Solinas ( , 1991 argues that districts are characterized by a wider role for firms in providing training to junior workers and by higher returns for skilled senior workers. This implies the existence of a peculiar IID wage curve, as workers are willing to accept reduced entry wages in exchange for on-the-job training, with the expectation of moving up the wage scale when they become senior workers, and/or with the prospect of starting their own activity.
2 However, in a study on the provinces of Treviso and Vicenza Cingano (2000) does not find any evidence of a difference in the returns to seniority between IIDs and non-IIDs. In an analysis of the IID labor market using data from the Italian Social Security Institute, Casavola, Pellegrini and Romagnano (2000) do not find any clear evidence of a district wage premium. They argue, however, in favor of higher returns to seniority in IIDs, greater district worker mobility between jobs and higher district propensity to self-employment. 3 To our knowledge, no prior empirical analysis on the returns to education in IIDs has ever been undertaken.
Our results, based on IIDs taken as a whole, are noticeable. We find a very limited role for geographical proximity. As for wages, we find only fragmentary evidence of a widespread wage premium within districts. Moreover, we find no evidence of district differentials for the returns to seniority, while district differentials for the returns to education might be negative. As for self-employment and labor mobility, we find that dwelling in a district has no impact on the probability of being self-employed and only a minor impact on the likelihood of transiting from wage-and-salary work to self-employment.
Finally, there is no evidence of higher district worker mobility across jobs.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II provides some background information on the Italian industrial districts. Section III describes the data set. Section IV provides the results. Section V concludes.
Italian Industrial Districts
IIDs are geographically defined productive systems, characterized by a large number of firms that are involved, at various stages and in various ways, in the production of a homogeneous product (Pyke, Becattini, and Sengenberger (1990) ). Most IIDs are located in the Center and in the North of Italy (in particular in the North-East). District firms are mostly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) specialized mainly in traditional sectors.
Different IIDs specialize in different products of varying complexity and intended end-use.
The role of IIDs can hardly be overstated: while SMEs provide over 70 percent of the Italian manufacturing output (Eurostat (1996) ), the IID share of total GDP is over 42 percent (Istat (1996) ). This latter share is even higher for sectors like apparel, textile, furniture, and leather. The best known examples of IIDs are Prato, Carpi and Biella (specialized in textile), Sassuolo (ceramic tiles), S. Croce sull'Arno and Solofra (leather), Martina Franca (furniture), Barletta and Civitanova Marche (shoes).
A number of definitions have been proposed for IIDs (Becattini (1991) and Brusco (1991) ). These definitions refer to a set of elements of various nature: economic, institutional, sociological, and demographic. They extend Marshall's rationale to include the role played by the community and by the local institutions in favoring the diffusion of information and co-operative behavior among agents. For example, Becattini (1991) defines
IIDs as "a socio-territorial entity which is characterized by the active presence of both a community of people and a population of firms in one naturally and historically bounded area" where "community and firms tend to merge". These definitions are certainly intriguing, but they are difficult to relate to a quantitative benchmark, which is necessary to undertake empirical work. In the last decade, the shortcomings of the descriptive definitions led to the search for statistical criteria based on the productive system's structural characteristics, such as the specialization pattern and the presence of SMEs. These methodologies are necessarily partial with respect to the descriptive concept of industrial district. They are also discretionary, since minor changes in the key algorithm parameters would deliver different results. In this study (see next section), in order to minimize the extent of discretion involved, we use three different measures of agglomeration.
Data
We use data from the 1998 Bank of Italy Survey Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). This is a biannual survey that collects information on the economic behavior of Italian families at the microeconomic level (detailed information on the SHIW can be found in Brandolini (1999) IIDs are singled out from LLMAs by the following four criteria:
1) the share of manufacturing employment in total non-farm employment must be higher than the corresponding share at the national level;
2) the share of SME manufacturing employment in total non-farm employment must be higher than the corresponding share at the national level;
3) for at least one sector, the specialization index must be greater than one. The specialization index is the ratio between the share of sector employment in total manufacturing employment and the corresponding share at the national level;
4) in at least one sector for which the specialization index is greater than one, the share of SME employment in total employment must be higher than the corresponding share at the national level. Logit estimating the probability for each LLMA to be classified as an IID according to the four ISA criteria. Thus, it represents an extension of the ISA methodology to the continuum.
Evidence
Our empirical strategy includes three building blocks. First, in Section IV.A we measure whether wages within IIDs are significantly different from wages elsewhere, controlling for workers', firms' and geographic areas' observable characteristics. In this section, we also analyze the role of the Mincerian determinants of wages. Then, in Section IV.B we estimate the extent to which the probability of being self-employed, the likelihood of transiting from wage-and-salary to self-employment, and the worker mobility across jobs are higher in IIDs than elsewhere. Section IV.A and IV.B rely on the ISA definition. Section IV.C provides a robustness check based on two alternative measures of agglomeration. Earnings are measured after tax. We do not expect the use of net rather than gross earnings to significantly underestimate wage differentials, since tax structure is very similar across LLMAs. An additional problem is underreported income: if the gray economy is more prominent in IIDs, then the omission of this income source might lead to underestimation of district differentials. We use hourly earnings in order to take into account irregular and overtime hours, which could be of some relevance in IIDs.
Wages
9 Using residence as the only identifying criterion for IID workers could in principle be criticized on the ground that district firms are typically small sized and operate in the manufacturing sector, while we include all the workers residing in the IID area, as it is singled out by ISA. If district wage premiums were only limited to SME manufacturing workers, the residence criterion could bias downwards our results. To lessen any fear that our results could depend on an erroneous identification criterion, in table 3 and 4 we restrict our sample to narrower characterizations of IIDs. 10 We also tested different specifications not shown here for the sake of conciseness. In particular, we estimated a version of Eq. (1) after decomposing EXP in two components: TENURE with the current employer, and PRIOR EXP, computed as EXP -TENURE (see below). Moreover, we replicated all the estimations with either EXP or AGE and TENURE. Finally, we also run all the regressions on the log of annual wages rather than the log of hourly wages. Since this last set of specifications did not give particularly interesting results, we will not comment them any further.
11 EXP is calculated as the difference between current age and age at the first job held. Our proxy is thus more accurate than that computed by subtracting the years of schooling from age, since we do not erroneously attribute potential waiting unemployment to labor market experience. In contrast, AGE should be viewed as a more imperfect proxy of labor market experience, since it includes the years of schooling, possible unemployment periods, and labor market experience. When we replace EXP with AGE the IID wage differential lowers because AGE fails to recognize that IID workers enter the labor market earlier than non-IID workers.
only a breakdown between manufacturing and services and does not provide more detailed information about the branch of activity of the employee's firm.
12 (iii) The SHIW data set provides information about the employee's work status (blue-collar, office worker, junior manager, and manager). However, whether to control for work status is an open issue, since wages are likely to be correlated with status. Controlling for work status could hence bias the education coefficient downwards. We tackle this issue on the empirical ground and we provide estimates for both controlling and non-controlling for the employee's work status. Table 1 provides results. 13 The fit of the regression is quite good and all the variables are significant, with point estimates close to what was found in previous studies using the SHIW (Cannari and D'Alessio (1995) and Colussi (1997) ), 14 even though returns to education turn out lower and returns to labor market experience higher than other authors'
estimates. This is true regardless of the proxy used for labor market experience, and it is due to the fact that our sample excludes public sector workers, who have relatively high education levels and a compressed wage structure (Alesina, Danninger and Rostagno (2001) ). Crucially, DISTRICT is positive and significant at the usual levels only in the regressions with EXP, 15 with an earning premium for cluster workers amounting to 3 percent.
16
To analyze the role of the Mincerian determinants of wages within clusters, we estimate a version of Eq. (1) that allows for interaction terms between RHS variables and 12 In particular, wages differ between low and high-intensity sectors. Thus, controlling for the extent to which the LLMA contains traditional versus high technology industries (PAVITT1-4), should help to offset the SHIW's lack of information on the firms' branches of activity. 13 While the results presented in this paper are based on the 1998 SHIW, our conclusions are overwhelming confirmed when pooling 1995-1998 SHIW data.
14 The aim of these papers is the analysis of the nationwide returns to education and to labor experience, with no reference to IIDs. 15 In the specification in which we decompose EXP into TENURE and PRIOR EXP, we find that the nationwide effect of TENURE is quite strong and comparable in size with the effect of PRIOR EXP. However, we do not find any district specific effect.
16 While in principle the presence of a centralized wage bargaining system could reduce earning differentials between areas, there is still considerable margin for wage differentials in Italy (according to Mauro, Prasad, and Spilinbergo (1999) wage differentials across regions, sectors and gender, vary between 10 and 30 percent; see also Alesina, Danninger, Rostagno (2001) ).
DISTRICT.
17 Results are shown in Table 2 . As for the district differential effects, no significant contribution of labor market experience is found (the interaction terms of EXP and AGE with DISTRICT are never significant). Moreover, there is evidence of negative cluster differentials for the returns to education (in column (2.1) the reduction in the SCHOOL coefficient associated with cluster workers is about a half of the national average).
The dummy DISTRICT, which is now meant to capture district wage differentials due to factors other than education and labor market experience, continues to be positive and significant only in the specifications with EXP. Summarizing, these results would suggest that IID wages might display a positive premium, which, however, does not reflect labor market experience. Moreover, this premium is eroded by a negative district differential for education, which penalizes relatively more the workers with higher human capital (for example, results of column (2.1) would indicate that district wages are lower than nondistrict wages for workers with more than 13 years of schooling, which is the threshold for a high school diploma). ISA is based on the prevalence of manufacturing, it is a matter of debate whether firms located within IIDs but belonging to sectors other than the industrial ones should be considered as part of the district; (ii) while ISA is based on the prevalence of SMEs, it is a matter of debate whether large firms located within IIDs should be considered as part of the district; (iii) it is also a matter of debate whether our nationwide sample should rather be replaced by the sub-sample of IIDs located in the Center and North of Italy, which constitute a more homogeneous geographic area. In order to provide some robustness checks for the above issues, in Table 3 and Table 4 we show the results respectively for the specifications of column (1.1) and (2.1) estimated in different sub-samples. In the first column we exclude non-manufacturing firms from the sample. In the second column, we keep only SMEs, lifting the restriction on the manufacturing sector. In the third column, we apply the two restrictions simultaneously so that our sample comprises only manufacturing SMEs. Finally, we add a new restriction: we keep only the manufacturing SMEs located in the Center and
North. The main consequence of our check is that DISTRICT loses its significance (Table   3 ). This is also due to the fact that restricting the sample towards narrower characterizations of IIDs makes the negative district differential in SCHOOL even more pronounced: it represents 72 percent of the returns to education in (4.1) and above 80 percent in (4.3) and (4.4).
We turn then to econometric issues. Since Griliches (1977) , it is well known that there are a number of problems with the estimation of Eq. (1) by least squares using measured data. In particular, there are three issues. First, there could be an omitted variable problem, since ability, which is not observed, is presumably correlated with both Mincerian variables and wages. Second, there could be an endogeneity bias since human capital accumulation is the result of optimizing choice, taken by both individuals and their families in contexts where financial possibilities matter. Third, there could be a measurement error problem with both the education data, which are available as years of schooling, and proxies for labor market experience, which are measured as number of years spent working.
It is worth mentioning that the huge literature on the subject has not provided a clearcut answer regarding the sign and the size of the bias. Moreover, since we focus on wage differentials between IIDs and isolated firms, the role of these biases for our results could be secondary: if there are biases, they may be similar across district and non-district areas and thus our estimates would still give useful cross-location information. Nevertheless, to provide some correction for the three econometric problems mentioned above we use instrumental variable estimates as suggested, for example, by Rosen (1977) . This is also the preferred estimation strategy employed by D'Alessio (1995) and Colussi (1997) , so that their results could be easily compared with ours. In line with this work, we use family background variables as instruments: mother's and father's years of schooling and age. Table 5 and Table 6 show IV and OLS estimates for the sample of workers who provided information on age and educational attainment of the parents (the regressions correspond respectively to the specifications (1.1) and (1.2); and (2.1) and (2.2)).
The endogeneity of education does not seem to be a problem in our data: the Hausman test does not enable us to reject the null hypothesis of esogeneity. This is somewhat contrary to what was expected. Indeed, the Hausman test indicated that there was an endogeneity issue with SCHOOL in both the papers by D'Alessio (1995) and Colussi (1997) . Our results are due to the fact that we use the 1998 survey of the SHIW, while the two papers refer to previous year surveys. 19 It is also worth mentioning that the Sargan test never enables us to reject the null hypothesis of orthogonality between the earning function residuals and the instruments. This implies that the variables of family background can be considered good instruments.
By and large, our findings remain confirmed. 20 In Table 5 , while the point estimate of SCHOOL increases as expected, DISTRICT remains of a little size and barely significant. In Table 6 , the IV correction brings about a reduction in the statistical significance of both DISTRICT and SCHOOL*DISTRICT. Overall signs and sizes of the corrections resulting from IV estimates are minor, as expected given the results of the Hausman test.
Finally, it should be mentioned that our findings could in principle be affected by selfselection. If the hypothesis that within IIDs the transition from wage-and-salary to selfemployment is easier turns out to be true, then our IID sample of observed wages could be biased downwards. Experienced and/or more talented workers would drop out from our sample, so lowering average wages. To correct for such a problem, we estimate an Heckman selection model. In order to determine whether the dependent variable is observed, the Heckman selection model calculates the likelihood of being an employee among a sample of employees and self-employed persons, using parents' educational attainment (MSCHOOL and FSCHOOL) and parents' work status (MWSTATUS and FWSTATUS) as selection variables. This set of selection variables are proven to be key for the Italian case due to 19 To understand the reasons of this discrepancy, we replicated the specification used by Colussi (1997) , which excludes the LLMA's unemployment rate and PAVITT specialization indexes, and all DISTRICT variables, both for 1993 (the year he analyzes) and 1998. Since Colussi's sample differs from ours (it includes, for instance, only heads of the household, males, working full-time and all year), we also replicated his sample. We find that for the 1998 data, the null hypothesis of no systematic difference between the IV and OLS coefficients cannot be rejected, even with the model specification and the sample used by Colussi. 20 IV estimates (not shown here) were also run for all the models of Tables 1 and 2 . Again, our results were broadly supported.
children's propensity to follow their father's profession (Barca and Cannari (1997) ). The likelihood-ratio test for correlation between the regression and the selection equations always allows us to reject the null hypothesis of no correlation (at 1% statistical significance), which justifies the Heckman selection model with our data. Table 7 and Table 8 show the results (again, the specifications shown correspond to (1.1), (1.2) and (2.1), (2.1)). The Heckman selection model does not provide any significant correction (for example, in columns (7.1) and (7.2) the average predicted dependent variable is equal respectively to 2.60 and 2.64). As it will be clear in the next section, this comes to no surprise, since the hypothesis of quicker district move to self-employment does not receive empirical support.
Self-Employment and Labor Mobility
Is self-employment made easier within IIDs? This is a crucial issue for Italy, whose economy is more reliant than other OECD countries on SMEs. It is therefore important to understand the relative role of agglomerations, which are deemed to be areas prone to entreprenuership. We single out two categories of self-employment: entrepreneur (business owner, owner or assistant in family business, active shareholder or partner) and free-lance (who runs his/her own activity with no employees). In the Appendix, Table A .2 displays some descriptive evidence, which highlights that the share of entrepreneurs in total sample (and to a lesser extent, that of free-lance workers) is higher in IIDs than in non-IIDs. Table 9 reports the empirical results from Logit estimation where the dependent variable is a binary indicator, equal to l if a respondent pursues: an entrepreneurial activity (column (9.1)); a free-lance activity (9.2); either of the two (9.3). The sample includes 4322 persons, 989 of who are self-employed. We add the dummy DISTRICT to the specification adopted by Barca and Cannari (1997) . In the first column, the coefficients for AGE and AGESQR display the expected sign and high significance. The coefficient for SCHOOL is not significant, highlighting the negligible role that education has for the chance of becoming an entrepreneur. The dummies FMANEX and FENTFL (equal to 1 respectively for those with a father manager or executive and those with a father entrepreneur or free-lance) are large in size and significant, stressing the role of intergenerational links in Italy. Surprisingly, the IID dummy variable shows no impact on the probability of becoming an entrepreneur. In the second column, the likelihood of working free-lance does not vary much with age, decreases with education, and is less affected by intergenerational persistence. The district dummy again shows no effect. The results of the third column confirm these findings.
These results have been double-checked in a number of experiments. First, in analogy with Table 2 , we Logit estimated equations that allow for interactions between RHS variables and DISTRICT. Moreover, we run regressions without FMANEX and FENTFL.
No differential district effects were ever found. Second, we provide sensitivity analysis for these results, in analogy with Table 3 and 4. Again, the irrelevance of agglomeration for selfemployment was strongly confirmed.
To test more directly the hypothesis that within IIDs the transition from wage-andsalary to self-employment is easier, we run two additional sets of Logit estimates. First, the SHIW provides the binary variable BOTH, which is equal to 1 for those who have worked both as employees and as self-employed (757 in our sample). We estimate the probability of being BOTH=1 in column (9.4). We find again no role for DISTRICT, while this probability is affected by SCHOOL and does not depend on the family work status. Second, we estimate the probability of being self-employed only for the sub-sample of those who had at least one work experience as employees (the descriptive evidence of Table A .2 shows that the share of entrepreneurs who previously worked as employees is substantially higher in IIDs). This reduced our original sample to 3,545 observations, 397 of which self-employed. Results are displayed in Table 10 , which corresponds to the first three columns of Table 9 . The likelihood of transiting from employee to entrepreneur is highly correlated with AGE and it is not driven by intergenerational links. Instead, the transition from employee to free-lance is not affected by AGE, while SCHOOL gives some (small) contribution. In both estimates, the dummy for agglomeration is never significantly different from zero; in the third column, however, we find a positive (and barely significant) contribution of DISTRICT.
Once more, these findings have been verified both by estimating equations that allow for interactions and by moving to narrower definitions of IIDs. The only notable upshot is that DISTRICT affects positively the likelihood of transiting from employee to free-lance (but not to entrepreneur) when the sample is consists of only manufacturing SMEs.
Is worker mobility across jobs higher within agglomerations? To check this claim we estimate a POISSON maximum-likelihood regression for the number of activities, including temporary ones, performed up to 31 st December 1998. Results are shown in Table 11 .
Column (11.1) provides the results for the sub-sample of employees. Surprisingly, DISTRICT has a highly significant negative sign. We then check this result on several grounds. First, to accommodate the fact that within IIDs the distinction between types of activities could be misleading, since employees could move to self-employment for peculiar circumstances, 21 the dependent variable was estimated for the wider sample of employees and self-employed (11.2). In this case, DISTRICT is less significant but still negative.
Second, as before, we estimate for both specifications (11.1) and (11.2) equations that allow for interaction terms between RHS variables and DISTRICT, and we increasingly restrict our sample according to the sensitivity analysis proposed in Tables 3 and 4 . 22 In these experiments, we never find any DISTRICT effect.
Beyond the ISA Definition of Clusters
The results of Section IV.A and IV.B are based on the identification of agglomerations provided by the official ISA criterion. The extent to which the crucial features of IIDs are accurately captured by this criterion has raised a number of controversies (Brusco and Paba (1997) and Cannari and Signorini (2000) ). In particular, the ISA splits up the LLMAs in two groups: districts and non-districts. The underlying idea is that non-linearities play a role: district effects materialize only above the ISA thresholds.
In this section we test whether our results could be due to the specific characteristics of the ISA. First, we verify whether the ISA thresholds are set at too low a level. In other words, the fact that in a number of respects cluster labor markets do not differ from noncluster ones, could be due to ISA classifying too many LLMAs as IIDs. To this end, we replicate the analysis of the above two sections for Superdistricts (DISTRICT_S) rather than for the ISA IIDs. Second, we test whether our results could be due to the ISA being too tight. 21 For example during business cycle peaks. 22 Moreover, we run regressions on the sub-samples of blue-collar workers and of younger than 50 employed people.
That is, IIDs and non-IIDs might indeed display similar characteristics to some extent and their being split up in two groups by ISA may be too an artificial devise. For this purpose, we extend the ISA methodology to the continuum by substituting DISTRICT with a continuos variable (DISTRICT_C) that associates each LLMA a value for the degree of district features shown.
23
Both DISTRICT_S and DISTRICT_C take the ISA as starting point. This is a nice feature of these indicators. As a matter of fact, different algorithms to single out districts could be proposed. However, abandoning the ISA criterion would not be without costs: to facilitate cross-country comparisons, ISA-type criteria are now being established by a number of OECD countries (OECD (2001)). Moreover, the ISA criterion is now a cornerstone of regional policy in Italy. Table 12 gives a flavor of our analysis. In this table we replicate models (1.1) and (2.1), replacing DISTRICT with the two alternative indicators of agglomeration. The results of the previous sections are awesomely supported: since DISTRICT_S and DISTRICT_C are never significant in our earning functions, with the notable exception of negative Superdistrict differential returns to education (which appear only when we restrict our sample to manufacturing). Analogously, there are no different results for self-employment and labor mobility determinants. The only exception to the lack of a specific agglomeration effect lies is the likelihood of transiting from wage-and-salary worker to free-lance, as the dummy DISTRICT_C in this equation is positive and significant.
Conclusions
The theoretical literature on agglomeration puts a lot of emphasis on the labor market motive. Empirically, this literature suggests that labor market pooling affects wages, entry into self-employment, and worker mobility between jobs. The evidence presented in these paper amounts to a call for caution. We find little evidence of cluster differential effects for both wages and worker mobility. We also find no evidence of agglomeration differential 23 As in Cannari and Signorini (2000) . returns to seniority, while the only cluster specific effect that our data reveal is a negative differential for the returns to education. Finally, as for self-employment, the only role that agglomeration seems to play is limited to the transition from wage-and-salary work to freelance employment.
At first glance, our results indicate that the first pillar of Marshall's story does not contribute much to the explanation of agglomeration in Italy. However, a different story could be proposed. Our results do not deny that the gains from labor market pooling could be important. Rather, they challenge the view that those gains benefit both firms and workers, since the advantages from participating in a pooled labor market seem to be quite limited for employees, at least in terms of wages and labor mobility.
It should be reiterated that, in contrast to case-studies, our conclusions rely on a general empirical investigation. That is, our analysis focuses on pooled labor markets taken as a whole, as they are singled out by the ISA cluster classification criterion (and by the two alternative criteria of Section IV.C). Consequently, our analysis does not preclude the possibility that the theoretical predictions are true in specific cases.
Finally, a number of suggestions for future research could be derived from our results.
First, the relative bargaining strength of firms and workers within clusters seems to be an interesting topic, since the benefits of labor market pooling do not appear to be reaped by workers. In particular, workers who accumulated sector-specific human capital seem to have done so at the expense of education. Accordingly, it would be interesting to analyze whether this under-accumulation of generalist human capital might have weakened workers' bargaining power (perhaps by lowering their chances of finding another job). Second, the fact that worker mobility across jobs does not appear to be higher in agglomerations than in the rest of the country casts doubts on the idea that district firms' labor demand schedules are imperfectly correlated; a closer look at the characteristics of demand shocks for cluster firms would add an important piece of evidence. Finally, our results suggest that within IIDs there could be a relation between the modest role of education (for both workers and entrepreneurs) and the districts' specialization in traditional sectors. It would be extremely important to understand the features and the consequences of such a relation, also with reference to the recent findings of Bils and Klenow (2000) , who take a critical view of the traditionally proposed growth-enhancing role of schooling. (5.3) and (5.4) do not include controls for employee's work status. -Instruments: age and educational qualifications of the parents. The Hausman test never allows us to reject the null hypothesis of esogeneity (at 1% statistical significance). -The Sargan test never allows us to reject the hypothesis of orthogonality of the IV regression residuals and the instruments (at 1% statistical significance). -The sample includes only workers who provided information on parents' age and educational qualification. (6.3) and (6.4) do not include controls for employee's work status. Instruments: age and educational qualifications of the parents. -The Hausman test never allows us to reject the null hypothesis of esogeneity (at 1% statistical significance). -The Sargan test never allows us to reject the hypothesis of orthogonality of the IV regression residuals and the instruments (at 1% statistical significance). -The sample includes only workers who provided information on parents' age and educational qualification. -The likelihood-ratio test for correlation between the regression and the selection equations always allows us to reject the null hypothesis of no correlation (at 1% statistical significance). -The sample includes all the employees and self-employed who provided information on education qualification and work status of the parents.
-The Heckman Selection Model estimates the likelihood of earning a wage (that is, of observing the dependent variable) by using 4,045 observations (2,809 employees and 1,236 self-employed). PAVITT1-4. These four variables denote the LLMA's PAVITT specialization indexes for the following categories: high technology, specialization, scale intensive, and traditional sectors. For each PAVITT category j, the specialization index is the ratio between the share relative to the LLMA and the share relative to the country of category j's employees in total manufacturing industry's employees: where N is the number of employees, j refers to Pavitt's four categories, m to manufacturing, LLMA to local labor market area, and ITA to Italy. PAVITT1-4 are computed by adapting PAVITT's classification, originally made for the 1981 ATECO system, to the 1991 ATECO system. SCHOOL. The information on education available in the survey refers to the highest qualification earned by the individual. We derived the length of education by assigning: 0 years to no qualification; 5 years to elementary school; 8 years to middle school; 11 years to professional secondary school diploma; 13 years to high school; 16 years to an associate degree or other short course university degree; 18 years to a bachelor's degree; and 20 years to a postgraduate qualification.
SMEs. This is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm has less than 100 employees.
SOUTH. This is a dummy that equals 1 if the individual resides in the South of Italy.
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE. The LLMA unemployment rate is calculated as the ratio of job seekers in total labor force, using 1996 Istat's Labor Force Survey.
WSTATUS. This is variable that assumes the following values: 1 -Blue-collar workers 2 -Office worker; 3 -Junior manager; 4 -Manager; 5 -Member of the professions; 6 -Business owner; 7 -Free-lance; 8 -Owner or assistant of a family business; 9 -Active shareholder or partner. 
